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Nomos!1 An incredible work! What is not in it? Legal history, legal
theory, Biblical and Talmudic deliberation, literary criticism, anthropol-
ogy, psychology, philosophy of science, . . . I could go on. It is more than
any category into which it can be pigeonholed. I told Bob Cover when I
first read it: "It's not the best article I've read about X or Y; it's the best
article I've read about anything!"
Here, I respond to Nomos as an educator, with some broad general
reflections on the role of law in education. These reflections embody some
of the impact that the years of friendship with Bob have had upon me, an
offering to the memory of Robert Cover, my extraordinary student, friend,
colleague, and teacher. Zikhrono li-vrakhah!-may his memory be for a
blessing.
First, a reminiscence. In the summer of 1960, I was assistant rabbi and
youth-program director at Congregation Kehillath Israel, Brookline, Mas-
sachusetts. I hired Bob Cover, then sixteen years old, for the summer to
help prepare educational programs and materials for the coming year.
The summer's work, for which Bob received the magnificent sum of one
hundred dollars, took place every afternoon, but the mornings were for
study of the Talmud. From 11:00 to 12:00 we would review what he had
studied on his own during the previous two hours. Often, I admit, the
t Professor of Education, Jewish Theological Seminary of America; Professor of Religion and
Education, Teacher's College, Columbia University. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the
Yale Law Journal editorial staff, especially the helpful suggestions of Ted Gentry and the "Tal-
mudic" feedback of Steve Gold. Responsibility for any errors is mine.




Talmudic discussion continued through lunch into the afternoon's "work"
period.
I am reasonably certain after twenty-six years that we studied a portion
of the Babylonian Talmud that deals with the laws of theft, conversion,
and restitution.2 Much of this material was not in force by the time the
Talmud was edited in the sixth century, yet it, and similar Talmudic
sources, were and are the wellspring and expression of Jewish conscious-
ness down to the present day.
Bob had some previous Talmudic background, having studied in the
high school department of the Boston Hebrew College, but the text, with
its Aramaic terminology and condensed and rigorous logic, was not easy.
Nevertheless, before the summer was over I had the distinct impression
that I was no longer the teacher but had become his haver (fellow stu-
dent);' in some respects, he had become the teacher!
It was during this period that we hatched a crazy idea that we called
"The American Talmud." Our plan was to bring together outstanding
authors and thinkers, along with stories from their lives and works. For
starters, we identified Freud, Einstein, Marx, and Darwin (the irony of
using these authors in our "American" Talmud was, I think, lost on us
then)-people who significantly joined the great human issues. We would
cluster them, with scissors and paste if necessary, in an interactive style
bearing the hallmarks of Talmudic discourse and logic. That is, we did
not plan to present these thinkers in the usual serial thematic anthology
format (what each had to say about this or that topic), but rather in a
constructed deliberation with one another. The essential idea was to pre-
sent sources whose original formats were linear and univocal in a multi-
perspectival, dialogic, simultaneous debate on contemporary issues. We
wanted to experience the deliberation, the inquiry itself, not the separate
conclusions, as each of these greats hurled challenges at the others. We
would not be bound by the need to use their actual words. We would
supply the connective tissue for their hypothetical debates from what we
already knew or could learn about their views.
Oh, I wish I had notes from those planning sessions: the arguments as
we chose the sources, tried to understand them, and juxtaposed one
against the other, our sense of the different directions in which the whole
enterprise might go, and more. What sounded so good in the discussion
2. The ninth chapter of Massekhet (tractate) Baba Kamma, entitled Hagozel Etzim . . . ("If a
man stole wood and made it into utensils . . ... "). Baba Kamma 93b.
3. Haver is the Hebrew term of which Cover is a transliteration. It means literally "friend," but
is used in the rabbinic tradition as a term for one with whom one studies Talmud in a collegial
relationship, i.e., b'havruta. In Talmudic times, title haver was conferred upon those who accepted a
strict regimen of observance or, later, upon scholars of singular ability. It evolved over time to its
present meaning. See Haver, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1490-91 (1971).
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between us, alas, was more interesting than the modern Talmudic inquir-
ies that we were able to construct on paper, perhaps itself a clue to a
critical difference between oral and written traditions. I remember only
"Rabbi" Freud slugging it out with "Rabbi" Marx and the difficulties of
speculating beyond what we knew from the actual sources to what they
"would have said" in different situations.
I do not remember why the project was aborted after a while. Mainly, I
suppose, it halted because the summer came to an end and we had no
more large blocks of time; also, we did not know the material well enough
to work in it spontaneously and naturally. We were probably pulling ab-
stractions out of context, relying on stereotyped expressions divorced from
the great narrative worlds from which the chosen thinkers drew."
Although the project was not completed, upon reflection I see that I
have continued it in my own educational work. I will not presume that
Bob Cover's great work was influenced by the modest experience that I
have described, but it is one way that he touched my life. I will try to
carry it forward a few steps farther, nurtured by my reading of his Nomos
and Narrative.5
II. THE NATURE OF TALMUD
The Talmud6 is, after the Hebrew Bible, the greatest work in impor-
tance for Jewish tradition. All contemporary Jewish institu-
tions-synagogue, liturgy, holidays, etc.-as we know them are impossible
to understand apart from the way that they are crystallized and developed
in Talmudic literature. The Talmud also contains a vast corpus of civil
and criminal law, in addition to legalistic treatment of questions more
commonly associated with religious practices. It is a vast anthology of cen-
turies of legal argument, religious speculation, scriptural exegesis, histori-
cal and quasi-historical sources, personal legends, specific facts, fantastic
imaginings, and more. The editing is associative. One point leads to an-
4. Cover, supra note 1, deals extensively with the relation between law and its narrative roots and
expressions in different nomoi. There is interesting literature on "narrative modes of thought," see
Bruner, Narrative and Paradigmatic Modes of Thought, in LEARNING AND TEACHING THE WAYS
OF KNOWING 97 (1985) (84th Yearbook of the Nat'l Soc'y for the Study of Education, pt. 2) [herein-
after WAYS OF KNOWING], and on the relationship of narrative and theology, see M. GOLDBERG,
THEOLOGY AS NARRATIVE (1981); see also T. DRIVER, PATTERNS OF GRACE (1977).
5. Cover's other fine works carry on the same ideas. I have, however, chosen to focus on Nomos.
6. See D. HALIVNI, MIDRASH, MISHNAH, AND GEMARA (1986). I wish to thank Professor David
Halivni for his responses to my questions about his research. My discussion of Talmudic deliberation
and the redaction of the Gemara draws on Professor Halivni's oral communications as well as his
book. He is, of course, not responsible for any errors on my part. For more on the Talmud, see
Goldenberg, Talmud, in BACK TO THE SOURCES 129 (B. Holtz ed. 1984); D. DAUBE, COLLABORA-
TION WITH TYRANNY IN RABBINIC LAW (1965); J. NEUSNER, INVITATION TO THE TALMUD (1973)
(adapted for young people as LEARN TALMUD); Holtz, Introduction: On Reading Jewish Texts, in
BACK TO THE SOURCES 11 (B. Holtz ed. 1984); Holtz, Midrash, in id. at 177.
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other. A legal discussion leads to a story, a scriptural interpretation, a
fanciful piece of imagery. The arrangement of the Talmud, unlike that of
modern books, is not developmental, with the basics set forth first and the
rest following as logically as possible.'
A. A Tradition of Deliberation
In about 200 C.E.,8 the Mishnah, a roughly thematic collection of legal
traditions, was produced.' It was probably intended to be a definitive col-
lection of authoritative traditions to be studied, not a compendium of bind-
ing or statutory law.10 However, even though the Mishnah contains some
explicit Scriptural interpretation (Midrash), its legal statements are
presented primarily in apodictic style, eliminating both the Scriptural der-
ivation and the legal deliberations out of which they emerged. The Mish-
nah became the authoritative central study book of the rabbinical acade-
mies of Palestine and Babylonia, where the discussions of the Mishnah
were later-in the late fifth and early sixth centuries C.E.-edited as the
Gemara, with two versions corresponding to the two localities.11
The Gemara relates to the Mishnah as earlier sages related to the Bi-
ble. The scholars of the Gemara12 started from the assumption that they
were searching for and determining the meaning of God's revelation to the
Jewish people.1 3 To do this, they needed to reconcile the various earlier
traditions that had been collected in the Mishnah, the Tosefta (a similar
collection), and non-anthologized material handed down orally (Beraitot).
Often, these scholars transmitted the original deliberation behind the
Mishnaic "product," if it has been preserved. When necessary, they hypo-
thetically reconstructed it in order to reconcile the various sources insofar
as they understood them to be in conflict.14
7. D. HALIVNI, supra note 6, at 100.
8. "C.E." denotes Common Era, a term used by Jews in place of "A.D."
9. Production was by means of oral publication, as demonstrated by S. LIEBERMAN, The Publica-
tion of the Mishnah, in HELLENISM IN JEWISH PALESTINE 83, 87 (2d ed. 1962).
10. The editor was Rabbi Judah Ha-Nasi ("The Prince"), who combined earlier collections into
six Sedarim ("orders") composed of 63 Masekhtot (tractates or thematic subdivisions-singular Mas-
sekhet), covering the whole range of ancient Jewish law, expanded Biblical interpretations, and other
areas.
11. Together, Mishnah and Gemara make up the Talmud, although sometimes the Gemara itself
is called Talmud. In later times, the Babylonian Talmud (Talmud Babli) became more widespread
and popularly studied than the Jerusalem (or Palestinian) version (Talmud Yerushalmi), because,
among other reasons, the Diaspora academies of Babylonia achieved religious hegemony, and the
Talmud Babli has a more fully developed and more elegant style than the Jerusalem Talmud.
12. These are the Amoraim, Stammaim, and Saboraim. See D. HALVNI, supra note 6 at 98.
Stammaim is a term created by Halivni to identify the sages who created the discursive, deliberative
material of the Talmud, the anonymous connective tissue that characterizes the Talmudic form of
argumentation. Id. at 76 passim.
13. See Goldenberg, supra note 6; J. NEUSNER, supra note 6; Holtz, Introduction, supra note 6.
14. See D. HALIVNI, supra note 6, at 77, 79.
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The deliberations in the Gemara usually come to no conclusions with
regard to what the law will be in practice. In the time of the Gemara,
practice was probably diverse, with the rules of various local jurisdictions
depending upon which scholars were recognized in a given place. 5 The
method of the Gemara is discursive, reflecting the dialectic among these
scholars. Lines of discourse are followed up, often at length, even when
they are peripheral to the main line of argument."'
The task of the Gemara, then, is to be a deliberative interpretation of
the largely apodictic Mishnah, and to recapture the lost deliberation of the
earlier period. When necessary, the Gemara even invents-reconstructs if
you prefer-the original argument, or the very facts of the original case.
To describe it this way makes it seem artificial, but when experienced by
the student, Gemara is a rich and textured normative "world," something
like what Cover was later to call a nomos. This is especially true during
traditional oral study of the Gemara, when the students expressing the
argument on the page tend to speak for and with the sages in their con-
frontations, as if the sages were talking to each other today, even though
they may have lived centuries ago, and centuries apart from one another.
1 7
In addition to the contemporaneity that the traditional and dialogical
form of study brings about, the structure of the page itself adds a
"McLuhanesque" factor. From the time of the Daniel Bomberg printed
edition, 8 the commentaries and references to later codes have been printed
"around" the main Talmudic text, symbolically linking the commentaries
to the text and to each other, as if their dialogue also takes place across
the page. The printed page of Talmud reproduced below is exemplary.19
The Talmud assumes from the beginning and on every page thereafter
that the reader already knows the rest. To study Talmud is, as it were, to
recall what one already knows or is supposed to know; for a Jew, to
15. Only later, when the insecure political situation of the Jewish people required more uniform
practice, did scholars develop uniform principles for determining the law.
16. Halivni notes:
The Stammaim [scholars of the Gemara who flourished between 427 and 501 or 520] were
concerned almost exclusively with the "give and take," . . . . Page after page is filled with
discursive material without any discernible trend to tell us what the final decision ought to be.
To the Stammaim, theoretical learning was a main mode of worship, worth pursuing even if it
does not lead to practical decision making.
D. HALIVNI, supra note 6, at 76-77.
17. See M. ALEXENBERG, Toward an Integral Structure Through Science and Art, in MAIN
CURRENTS IN MODERN THOUGHT 149 (1974); S. HEILMAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE Boox (1983).
There are two dialogues, the dialogue on the page and the dialogue between the students who study
b'#avruta-in pairs. B'havruta has the same root as haver. See supra note 3.
18. 1520-1523 C.E. The pagination of this first printed edition of the Talmud has been kept in
all standard editions.
19. No two printed pages of the Talmud look exactly alike. The amount of Talmudic text printed
on a given page depends on the amount of associated commentary, all of which is printed on the page
with the text it annotates. The arrangement, "around" the main text, of the various commentaries
depends on their sizes relative to one another.
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First page of the Tractate Berakhot in standard edition of Talmud.
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Heading
1. The leter bet, indicating page two. aide one Them is no page one...
2. "B kho" [Treoste title]
3. "Pn hatr
4. "From When"; non chapters of the Mishnah. and therefoee of the Talmud. ae natmed after their ras words.
Major blocks of psi"f
A. [Text of) Mishnah Beenkhot I:, Note the ornate design wreoonding te te ord
B. The beginning of the gimara. The gtnara pertaining to tis .essn woul continue until page 91h
C. The ommentary of Rasthi (1040-1105)1.1
D. The coirnents of Tosafot (Rasi deicendants and discples)....
In keeping with the early curtoai of printer, the finst word on the next page is indicated for he gesnra, Rash.l and the Tosafot. This cossosn is especially
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b. C resfereites to medieval codes of Jewsh law. These mdes indude the Mtckth Torah of Mainindes (1135-1204), the Groat Co.nn
a nd
ntt-Bok;
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[footnotes omittedi
c. The comments of R Nisem Gacn (d. 1062)1.1
d. A textual emendation by R. Joel Sirkes (1561-1640)1.1
c. Notes by R. Aldba Eger (1761-1837)[.1
f. An anonymous cotmem, possibly added by the original pointers of this edition (Roomt, Vilna, 1880-86).]
g. Key to quotations from the Bible.]
Reprinted by permission from Goldenberg, supra note 6, at 140-42.
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articulate that which has already formed his existing Jewish conscious-
ness. 20 The Jew who is alienated from this consciousness is thereby in-
vited to simulate the socialization process which would have produced it,
and even to find those residues that are indeed present, though not in the
awareness. What does one do with a book that presumes the end in the
beginning? The Talmud is called in Jewish tradition Yam Ha-Talmud
("the sea of the Talmud"). What does one do in the sea? One swims!
B. Recapturing Deliberative Style
Modern books are linear and present the perspective of the individual
author. The author's inner deliberation with other perspectives is, for the
most part, buried and implicit in the smoothed out, reasoned argument
that is published or presented orally. If another view is presented at all, it
is usually refuted or incorporated, not given a fair presentation. The other
view never gets the opportunity to reply in medias res. On those occasions
when another view is fully stated, the same problem arises: That perspec-
tive too appears in a polished and univocal guise. The reader or listener is
left to his own devices to put the argument together. If each side is well
constructed and convincing this task is often difficult. The framework and
presuppositions of each author are hidden in the editing, and they may
seem to be speaking past each other.
21
Experienced scholars often conduct their inner deliberation intuitively
and may even find it hard to make this operation explicit to themselves
after the fact. The orderly thought process scholars describe after complet-
ing their work may bear little relation to their actual erratic course,
charted by leaps of creativity. They may find it difficult to recall it to
themselves, much less explain it to others. Such explanation is notoriously
lacking in many scholarly papers and much teaching by scholars. The
curriculum reform movement of the '60's, which tried to build curriculum
(the "new" Math, Physics, Social Studies, etc.) on the cornerstone of
scholars' authentic knowledge and methodology, had to face this prob-
lem.22 The division of knowledge into "disciplines" enhances the diffi-
culty. Disciplines are useful constructions of meaning that make it possi-
ble to handle the otherwise intractable complexities of life in the raw. Life
itself is neither historical, sociological, psychological, nor biological. Even
20. Cf. M. KADUSHIN, ORGANIC THINKING (1938); Norton, On Teaching What Students Al-
ready Know, 82 SCH. REV. 45 (1973).
21. See the outstanding essay on participatory reading, Schwab, Enquiry and the Reading Pro-
cess, 11 J. GEN. EDUC. 72 (1958), reprinted in SCIENCE, CURRICULUM, AND LIBERAL EDUCATION:
SELECTED ESSAYS 149 (I. Westbury & N. Wilkof eds. 1978) [hereinafter SELECTED ESSAYS].
22. See Lukinsky, Structure in Educational Theory (pts. 1 & 2), 2 EDUC. PHIL. & THEORY 15
(1970), 3 id. 29 (1971); see also J. BRUNER, THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION (1960); Schwab, Educa-
tion and the Structure of the Disciplines, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 21, at 229-72.
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within disciplines, especially in the social sciences and the humanities,
schools of thought with their separate frameworks give the student an illu-
sorily fragmented yet smoothed out version of reality.2" The usefulness of
the disciplinary structure of knowledge obscures the fact that, at some
point, a synthesis is necessary; the lack of this synthesis is, for most peo-
ple, the source of greatest disappointment concerning their education. This
synthesis need not smooth out all differences, but rather must articulate
the tensions that exist in a more total view; the experience should be one
of participating in these tensions, of feeling the pushes and the pulls.
The goal sounds almost unattainable, especially for the non-scholar.
Yet this is exactly what happens in the study of the Talmud. It became
and remains a book that a relatively large number of non-professionals
study, a scholarly work that almost can be considered a popular book for
the masses. It is studied by scholars and non-scholars alike, and even by
scholars and non-scholars together.24 There is something enormously com-
pelling about the style, the participation in the inquiry itself, the empathic
involvement in the deliberative decisionmaking process, and the re-
enactment of the dramatic process of the construction of meaning. The
model of Talmudic inquiry is, I contend, worth pursuing further as a
neglected paradigm for the improvement of the social studies curriculum.
The model also can be used to enhance the role of law in education
outside the professional study that takes place in law schools, and perhaps
even there.
III. TEACHING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION AS TALMUD?
The ultimate fantasy for the American educator has to be that the
American constitutional tradition could reach a state in which it is studied
by average Americans, not only in school as part of a required Civics
course or American History unit, but for recreation because it is capti-
vating and fun, a hobby to be pursued in one's spare time! In this year of
the Constitution's bicentennial, much effort has gone into increasing
awareness of the Constitution and its tradition at both scholarly and pop-
ular levels. Major efforts are underway from elementary school to the
university. Scholarly conferences abound.2 5 Let me join the fantasy here
and suggest what it would take to present the constitutional tradition
Talmudically.
23. See Schwab, supra note 22.
24. S. HEILMAN, supra note 17. Heilman makes a strong case for the social affirmation of com-
munal identity and commitment aspects of such study in laymen's groups.
25. For one attractive and important resource, see the periodical THIS CONSTITUTION: A BICEN-
TENNIAL CHRONICLE, Sept. 1, 1983 (first issue), and quarterly issues beginning with Spring, 1984.
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A. Applying the Talmudic Model to the Founding Fathers
The cardinal sin of history teaching is the assumption that what hap-
pened had to happen that way, and that the task of teaching is to explain
why. The ideas of the "losers" in history are often dismissed and the ideas
of the "winners" lose their sharpness when they are viewed in only one
dimension. The problem is not that the opposition is not mentioned, but
that students are handed a finished product, a "rhetoric of conclusions,"2
which deprives them of the potential experience of understanding those
ideas in depth.
The dynamic deliberations in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 that
produced our great national document are preserved in the official min-
utes of the Convention and in the notes of James Madison and others. 7
The views of the Federalists who promoted ratification are presented in
the well-known Federalist Papers, but the views of the Anti-Federalists,
without which the Federalist views are not completely understandable,
also need study.28 In this sense both the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists are Founding Fathers. The nomos was shared; it was a matter
of emphasis. As Storing points out,29 the most compelling argument of the
Federalists was that they proposed to change the situation, whereas the
Anti-Federalists sought only to maintain the status quo. The latter's sub-
stantive arguments, however, were no less in quality and wit. I am con-
vinced that the Talmudic model has something to contribute here.
Deconstructionist literary criticism, which has become increasingly rele-
vant to some schools of legal theory,30 restates the point.
[Jacques] Derrida contends that the structures-linguistic and other-
wise-that pattern human behavior result from acts of exclusion and
repression. As a post-Freudian, he realizes that the excluded does
not disappear but remains to disrupt the structures constructed to
domesticate it. The repressed returns to destabilize every structural
totality-social, political, religious, psychological or literary. In
deconstructive criticism one attempts to open a gap in every work by
teasing out the repressed that the text struggles not to express. In
contrast to the structuralist, who continues the philosophical project
26. See Schwab, The Teaching of Science as Enquiry, in THE TEACHING OF SCIENCE 3 (1962).
27. All are collected in Max Farrand's classic, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937); see also D. HALIVNI, supra note 6. Halivni points out the similar-
ity of Farrand's efforts to "sift through different versions of the deliberations" of the Convention to
those of the modem critical Talmud scholar who seeks to reconstruct the original Talmudic delibera-
tion. Id. at 138 n.10.
28. For a discussion of Anti-Federalist views, see H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS
WERE FOR (1981) (also available in I THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 3 (H. Storing ed. 1985)).
29. See id. at 7-14; see also M. KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION xvi (Penguin
1986).
30. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
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by translating the irrational into reasonable language, the decon-
structive critic insists that something always escapes language. There
is a remainder that is not only unsaid but unsayable.3"
Judicial opinions are historical crystallizations of ongoing disputes that
have persisted throughout our history. The majority and minority deci-
sions of the Supreme Court freeze the ongoing dialectic, as it were, around
certain focal points, but the process continues even then, as one sees in the
rise of minority opinions to later prominence.32
It is this continuation of the dialectic that I suggest be captured. The
Talmudic dialectic, in Halivni's view, is often an artificial reconstruction
after the fact. It is, however, experienced by the student as if it were
taking place now. The minority and majority decisions of the Supreme
Court are written after the conference of the Justices is over and they
retire to their respective chambers to reflect and formulate their opinions.
What if we had a tape recording of their interactive discussions around
the table and could join them there? What if the Justices of one court
could interact with those of other times, Brandeis and Rehnquist, Earl
Warren and Warren Earl Burger? To construct such deliberations retro-
spectively on the basis of the published majority and minority decisions
would be to parallel the redactional process of the Talmudic editors.
I am suggesting not only that the history teacher recapture the "What
ifs" of history-the knowledge that "things did not have to happen the
way that they did, [that] with some different twists of fate, Americans
might today live under a much different system of government.""3 I am
rather suggesting that we recapture the "feel" of the deliberations them-
selves. Americans are not well informed about the nature of legal deliber-
ation, and are willing enough to consider the "process of legal thinking" a
matter for experts. The conclusions of historical legal deliberations are not
presented in an interesting enough manner to attract the attention of most
people. Thus, the idea that the study of law for its own sake could be a
popular, lifelong, and intensely pleasurable activity, probably seems as
31. Taylor, Descartes, Nietzsche, and the Search for the Unsayable, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV.,
Feb. 1, 1987, at 34.
32. See A. BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR (1974). Barth discusses "prophetic" dissents which
enunciated arguments that later became accepted legal principles. Two notable examples are Justice
John Marshall Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which prefigured Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Justice Hugo Black's dissent in Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942), foreshadowing his majority opinion overruling Betts in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963). See also Cover, The Left, the Right and the First Amendment, 1918-1928, 40 MD.
L. REv. 349 (1981) (discussing concurring and dissenting opinions in free speech cases).
33. Martin, Beyond Fireworks: New York's Cerebral Salute to 1787, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1987,
at B19, col. 4.
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far-fetched as can be. Yet, the Talmudic model of students who study for
the joy of the deliberation, and not to memorize conclusions, is instructive.
The constitutional materials we now study are presented in linear fash-
ion. If indeed "the medium is the message," then we need to create a new
medium, bringing together the warp and the woof. I visualize a format in
which the text of the Constitution is unpacked and opened up, not merely
accompanied by a linear commentary. The interspersing of reconstructed
dialogues representing the Convention disputes and the Federalist/Anti-
Federalist debates, folklore elements, historical events and legends, later
judicial opinions, and trial court cases would be rich and textured. It
would create nomos.
An example here might help. Modern teachers present the debate at the
Convention which led to the "Connecticut Compromise" as a power
struggle between the large and small states that was finally resolved inge-
niously by a compromise that only diehards who would rather the whole
enterprise fail than give in could oppose. The issue, however, was more
complex. As many point out, the constitutional process at the Convention,
and in the later ratification events, hung in the balance on this point. 4 It
is only after the fact that the Compromise seems like the obvious and
logical solution. It is difficult to cast ourselves back into the amorphous
pre-Compromise situation, where the possibilities, options, and pressures
were not so clear. The fears of the small states were real enough. Having
just fought a Revolution to preserve local control over their lives, they
were not so ready to relinquish control to a faraway entity.
The statement of Patrick Henry, incredible to a modern audience that
takes for granted that "We the People" are indeed one people, is germane
here. Henry was not a Convention participant, but it casts a new light on
the Convention for us to transport him there, for he responded to the first
words of the Preamble as follows:
[W]hat right had they to say, We, the People? My political curiosity,
exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to
ask, who authorized them to speak the language of, We, the People,
instead of We, the States? States are the characteristics, and the soul
of a confederation. If the States be not the agents of this compact, it
must be one great consolidated National Government to the people
of all the States.35
Henry's objection, of course, was right on target. Consider this statement
34. E.g., Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 799
(1961).
35. H. STORING, supra note 28, at 12 (quoting Patrick Henry, speech to the Virginia State
Ratifying Convention, June, 1788).
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by Alexander Hamilton: "The clearest minds among the Federalists
agreed that states are the soul of a confederacy. That is what is wrong
with confederacies: 'The fundamental principle of the old Confederation is
defective; we must totally eradicate and discard this principle before we
can expect an efficient government.' -13
The construction of a curriculum for the teaching of this issue would
plunge the student back into the common nomos shared by Federalist and
Anti-Federalist alike. It would seek to recreate the point at which the two
sides divided on this issue, not merely to present the two sides in an or-
derly, precisely reasoned, linear fashion. It would follow the issue dialecti-
cally down through the Civil War to the Reagan Presidency.
B. The Law and the Curriculum
In this Section I will focus very broadly upon law-related aspects of
school social studies curricula and connect the relevant points of this dis-
cussion to some questions regarding the teaching of law in law schools.
In recent decades, educators from the kindergarten to the university lec-
ture hall have increasingly striven to integrate the study of law and the
legal system with social studies and citizenship education curricula, as
well as with other standard subjects such as history. In some cases there
has been an attempt to introduce law into the curriculum as a field of
study in its own right. 7
By and large, such curriculum designs stress "learning about" law,
about rights, duties, institutions of the law and their histories, legal
"know-how," law and society, and the like. Freund found these ap-
proaches lacking; they did not, in his view, provide what he calls "a vica-
rious participation in the process of legal thinking through immersion in
some of the problems and the literature of the common law."3" Freund's
proposal for the curriculum was to do just that, to teach the law in the
schools as "an enterprise, an ongoing process, whose study contributes to
an enlarged understanding of and participation in, the world around
us."
3 9
36. Id. (quoting Alexander Hamilton, quoted in THE DEBATES OF THE STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CON-
VENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 234 (J. Elliot 2d ed. Philadelphia 1866)).
37. For a fairly recent survey of efforts to introduce law into the school curriculum, see M. NEL-
SON, LAW IN THE CURRICULUM (1978); see also Freund, The Law and the Schools, 36 HARv. EDUC.
REV. 470 (1966) (important theoretical proposals), reprinted in P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE
108 (1968); A. ELSON, EDUCATING SCHOOL CHILDREN IN THE LAW (1967) (Ford Foundation Re-
port with appendix listing many curriculum projects); W. GIBSON, LESSONS IN CONFLICT (2d ed.
1972) (Boston University Law School Project, including curriculum units on broad range of standard
legal subject areas). The last two sources are typical material of this type.
38. Freund, supra note 37, at 471.
39. Id. at 470.
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Over the past two decades, a spate of new approaches to the social stud-
ies in general,4 have purported to involve students in various sorts of sim-
ulations, case studies, and practical deliberations in order to teach skills
such as "critical thinking," problem-solving, and decisonmaking. There
have been many approaches; some of the main trends have been spinoffs
of the cognitive moral education theories and programs of Lawrence
Kohlberg4 or the Values Clarification Movement originated by Louis
Raths and colleagues. 42 The skills sought are practical and deliberative
and are intended to serve students as tools for more successful involvement
with the problems of everyday life and with the issues faced by citizens in
a democracy. Most of these curricula stress the students' clarification of
personal values when confronted with a situation. The presentation, how-
ever, tends to focus upon predetermined alternatives; students receive little
opportunity to generate their own set of alternatives from study of the raw
situation. Nor are students given guidance as to how to entertain the vari-
ous options. Discussion of cases after the decision has been made is meant
to describe and justify the outcome after the fact.43
Cohen's study of curricula for teaching the different forms of practical
deliberation calls in question-indeed, in my opinion convincingly re-
futes-the exaggerated claims of these curricula.44 Cohen compares
Schwab's theoretical model45 of practical deliberation with written ac-
counts that preserve what really happens when people deliberate in a
practical context where a decision has to be made.46 Genuinely accurate
accounts are hard to find; most published recapitulations of such delibera-
40. These approaches have been tried even in curricula that do not focus on the law as such. The
best of the genre, I think, remains the Harvard Social Studies Project, directed by Donald W. Oliver
and Fred M. Newmann. The most relevant material from this project is the booklet (and accompany-
ing teacher's guide) HARVARD SOCIAL STUDIES PROJECT, THE LAWSUIT: LEGAL REASONING AND
CIVIL PROCEDURE (1968), which is directed at junior high and high school students. The theoretical
basis for the Harvard Project is presented in D. OLIVER & J. SHAVER, TEACHING PUBUC ISSUES IN
THE HIGH SCHOOL (1966).
41. See generally MORAL DEVELOPMENT, MORAL EDUCATION, AND KOHLBERG (B. Munsey ed.
1980).
42. The basic text of the Values Clarification Movement is L. RATmS, M. HARMIN & S. SIMON,
VALUES AND TEACHING (1966); see also S. SIMON, L. HOWE & H. KIRSCHENBAUM, VALUES CLAR-
IFICATION (1972).
43. See J. SCHWAB, COLLEGE CURRICULUM AND STUDENT PROTEST 113-82 (1969) (criticizing
this common style of teaching about law).
44. See B. Cohen, Criteria for Developing Curricular Proposals for the Teaching of Deliberation
(1974) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Chicago); see also Cohen, The Teaching of Delib-
eration in the Jewish School, in 2 STUDIES IN JEWISH EDUCATION 122 (M. Rosenak ed. 1984)
[hereinafter Teaching Deliberation].
45. J. SCHWAB, supra note 43, at 148-73.
46. Cohen finds rich material in accounts of the ascent of Mt. Everest by Sir John Hunt, docu-
ments from the "Pentagon Papers," accounts of President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile
crisis, and the records relating to Eisenhower's decision to proceed with D-Day in World War II. See
B. Cohen, supra note 44.
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tions are "cleaned up" and focused, after the fact, to such an extent that
they present a distorted picture.
For our purposes, the main points of Cohen's research are as follows:
(1) These curricula force efforts at problem solving and critical thinking
into models of theoretical inquiry that stress information gathering and
hypothesis formation and testing. Dewey's model of thinking47 is artifi-
cially turned into a recipe for a step-by-step linear process. (2) "Relevant"
factors are highlighted prematurely, in contrast to real situations. (3) The
curricula ignore broader, "generic" considerations that will legitimate a
choice of alternatives. Only the specific, focused data of the situation being
examined are considered. (4) The mix of subjective and objective elements
that one encounters in real settings is largely overlooked. (5) Most curric-
ula assume that the process is linear, that the "steps" can be taught as
discrete skills apart from a specific situation, and that all the steps are
necessarily present in each case.48 There is more, but this work explains
the disappointment that most educators have felt with their efforts in this
regard. My impression is that despite increasing curricular sophistication
and complexity, the basic thrust of Cohen's work is still valid.49 Students
participate in the enterprise of practical deliberation in only the most su-
perficial way.
C. Educational Lessons for Law Schools
Cohen studied, and criticized, social studies curricula that claim to
teach modes of problem solving, critical thinking, and decisionmaking. Of
course, the teaching of precisely these skills is stressed by law schools as
their main raison d'9tre. Thus, I find it especially interesting that Co-
hen's critique of social studies curricula that claim to teach modes of prob-
lem solving, critical thinking, and decisionmaking resonates with critiques
of legal education in law schools.50
In brief, since Langdell's creation of the case method in the nineteenth
century, that method has dominated the teaching of law in law schools.
For Levi, "[i]t is the greatest invention that has occurred in legal educa-
47. J. DEWEY, How WE THINK (2d ed. 1933).
48. See Teaching Deliberation, supra note 44.
49. Cf Steinberg & Caruso, Practical Modes of Knowing, in WAYS OF KNOWING, supra note 4,
at 133.
50. For my discussion of legal education in law schools, I have relied mainly upon material in E.
LEvi, FOUR TALKS ON LEGAL EDUCATION (1952) (old but still good), as well as F. DUTILE, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND LAWYER COMPETENCY (1981); H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEw DIRECTIONS IN
LEGAL EDUCATION (1972); see also ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCE (1979)
(commonly referred to as the Cramton Report).
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tion. It provides a means whereby students can be made to participate in,
and thus learn the art of legal reasoning."
51
The Socratic approach used by teachers in teaching by the case method
challenges the student to compare precedents with the rules of law previ-
ously derived from them and to apply the reasoning to new cases. This is
the characteristic teaching method of the first year of the law school cur-
riculum, generally conceded to be the most interesting and important of
the standard three year program.
52
As Levi and others have noted, the student learning by the case method
would indeed seem to be involved in the inquiry itself, in legal delibera-
tion as it is conducted from the inside. In many important respects, there-
fore, the classic case method could serve as a model for teaching legal
deliberation at other school levels. Facts are important, especially those
that make the application of rules difficult, and law school professors are
never happier than when they find a conflict of rules.5" But despite all its
virtues there remains a flaw. The case method gets its facts mainly from
appellate court case books. The original facts of the case as brought before
the trial court are largely unavailable or unused. "It is to the credit of the
law schools that they emphasize both fact and theory; it is too bad that
frequently they do not know what the facts are." '54
In the classroom, the law student does not come in contact with the
"situation in the raw." This unreality is made up for, in the legal realist
approach, by stressing the importance of additional knowledge drawn
from the social and behavioral sciences and from economics. It was also an
impetus to the establishment of legal clinics where students get the oppor-
tunity to handle real cases, supervised by trained staff and faculty mem-
bers. It is noteworthy that many approaches to social studies and civic
education at the school level have also stressed the involvement of students
51. E. LEvi, supra note 50, at 17.
52. See H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, supra note 50, at 30-31.
53. For examples of almost gleeful descriptions of rules in apparent conflict, see D. LOuIsELL, G.
HAZARD & C. TAIT, CASES & MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE STATE AND FEDERAL
494-544 (demonstrating existence of difficult-to-reconcile case law on Erie problem); id. at 903-44
(similar demonstration regarding scope of right to jury trial).
54. E. LEVI, supra note 50, at 31; see also Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum,
32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 331 (1982) (intermediate level of abstraction typical of appellate cases does
not permit teaching of legal theory or of practical legal skills); Feldman & Feinman, Book Review, 82
MICH. L. REV. 914, 928-30 (1984) (teaching of doctrine does not permit students to analyze facts in
a context or to learn to make choices in presence of uncertainty); Shreve, Bringing the Educational
Reforms of the Cramton Report into the Case Method Classroom-Two Models, 59 WASH. U.L.Q.
793, 796 (1981) (absence of facts from appellate opinions restricts students' exposure to true texture of
cases).
For a description of a casebook which attempts to remedy the failings outlined above, see Marti-
neau, Book Review, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 351-54 (1984) (reviewing S. MENTSCHIKOFF & I.
STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN LAW (1981)). Mentschikoff and Stotzky's text
employs exclusively unedited cases, in order to provide students with available facts. Additionally, the
authors include official summaries of the arguments of counsel.
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in real life situations.55 Yet clinical programs may suffer from the con-
verse problem of not being well integrated into the broader curriculum.
To function properly, a clinical program needs reflective guidance, con-
nection to the rest of the curriculum, and sufficient exposure to the classic
challenges of the law, which just may not "come up" in the clinical
setting. 56
In sum, both in law school and in social studies or civic education pro-
grams that attempt to embody legal thinking, the assimilation of the pro-
cess of legal thinking is contingent upon more than either the case method
or practical experience alone can offer. 57 The case method may teach the
rules of evidence, for example, but it may not teach the student how to
approach the facts of a real case. The clinical activity may have great
practical value, but it is limited by the quality of guidance that the student
receives."' There is often little coordination between the classroom and the
field activities.
The Talmudic model offers a way between these difficulties. The point
is not that the Talmud gets back to the facts of cases more adequately or
even that the study of the Talmud is intrinsically more interesting. It is
that to enter the study of Talmud is to enter the Jewish nomos in a par-
ticipatory way, to engage in an inquiry that is taking place now. To be
involved in the labyrinth of the discussion, of even rejected views, is to re-
experience it in a very personal way, from inside the inquiry itself. This
derives, as I have suggested, from the format of the text, its substantive
style, and from the way it is studied. From any objective point of view, it
may be a deliberation from the past, but these factors facilitate the stu-
dent's making it his own.
By contrast, the law or civics student-whether studying decided cases,
55. See J. Lukinsky, Teaching Responsibility: A Case Study in Curriculum Development (1968)
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Univ.). Robert Cover was a central staff person in the
summer camp Jewish citizenship program described in this dissertation.
56. This is a major issue of clinical training in all fields, including medicine, education, and the
like, see J. Lukinsky, supra note 55; for example, this is the reason medical students seek internships
in hospitals where the cases will be diverse. For further discussion of practical deliberation in
medicine, see A. ELSTEIN, L. SHULMAN & S. SPRAFKA, MEDICAL PROBLEM SOLVING (1978).
For the continuing debate regarding the proper place of clinical training in a law school curricu-
lum, see Anderson & Catz, Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Clinical Education: A Response
to the New Reality, 59 WAsH. U.L.Q. 727 (1981) (presenting model of clinical education); Brest, A
First-Year Course in the "Lawyering Process", 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 344 (1982) (describing experi-
mental course at Stanford Law School, employing simulated clinical exercises); Gee and Jackson,
Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 695 (extensive
study of history of legal education in America); Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and
Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1974) (assessment of clinical education as of 1972).
57. The focus in law schools may differ from that in law programs in schools. The latter may lay
greater explicit stress on teaching legal thinking in a way that generalizes to skillful problem-solving
and decisionmaking in the world at large.
58. Cf H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, supra note 50, at 42-43 (pressures of clinical situation can
inhibit good skills training).
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conducting simulations, or even facing clinical situations-is subjected to
narrow over-focusing of the problem even as he or she is led through the
decisionmaking process. Because I am not a legal scholar, I cannot claim
the kind of understanding that would allow me to construct a complete
legal curriculum in Talmudic style. It seems to me, however, that materi-
als from the general legal tradition lend themselves to being studied this
way. It may not be the most practical way of training lawyers, in the
short run, but it might hold the most interest for non-lawyers. And it
could ultimately be engrossing as a humanistic activity, but one with a
deeper practical worth, for lawyers in training too.
The United States Code Annotated, for example, is somewhat akin to
the Mishnah. It preserves the currently valid interpretations of Federal
statutes derived from Federal court opinions. These interpretations are
presented in apodictic fashion with some brief relevant detail from the
case, sometimes more, sometimes less. Overruled interpretations and cases
no longer relevant appear only in earlier volumes. The deliberation is
gone. It is static, implicit. It needs to be reconstructed by the reader who
flips back and forth between the statute and the case to see how one re-
lates to the other. To find the background, the reasoning in the case sup-
porting the interpretation, one looks up the case in a reporter that
presents the case in greater detail, but at the stage of the final argument of
the court. That is, the reasons for the decision are given in detail only
after all the reasoning has been done, with the weighting on the side of
the conclusions already reached. It seems to me that some solid curriculum
work could turn the Annotated Code, and similar sources, back to an ear-
lier stage, and create "Talmud."'59
Another example: A casebook like Prosser's Cases and Materials on
Torts,60 which is one of the staples of the first year of law school, presents
civil cases in detail and seems highly amenable to what I am suggesting. It
is already on the borderline. The notes after each case, which usually
simply refer to other cases, could, if followed up, supply the cutting edge
that I am looking for and reopen the dialectic. Good Socratic teaching, the
59. Interestingly, one of the earliest American legal works, St. George Tucker's edition of Black-
stone's Commentaries, has some intriguing Talmudic characteristics. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES (St. George Tucker ed. Philadelphia 1803). In many places, Tucker presents on the same page
Blackstone's original text, selected notes written by Edward Christian for his English edition of the
Commentaries, and Tucker's own notes on Virginia law. See, e.g., 2 id. at 281 (waste), 378 (wills),
448 (contracts for sale). Although there is no dialogue in Tucker's work, the reader is strongly invited
by the chronological development and the sounding of different voices to create for himself a story
about the process by which legal rules evolve. At its best, Tucker's Commentaries provides the reader
an entre into legal discourse.
It is a nice coincidence that one of Bob Cover's earliest published works was a review of the 1969
reissue of Tucker's edition of Blackstone. Cover, Book Review, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1475 (1970).
60. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 1982).
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high point of the case method, apparently also achieves this, especially
when the notes are dealt with in class. Never having experienced it, I
assume it is highly involving. It is, though oral for the most part, a tex-
tured inquiry with possibilities. Good teaching is necessary to make it
come alive, however. This is so even for law students, who tend, I am
told, to be concerned more with the practical conclusion, the rule of law
that they can use, than with the thrill of the chase. What I seek is the
simulation of the live discussion constructed on the page. I want students,
without a Socratic teacher, to be able to continue, stimulated by the page,
"Socratically" on their own.
IV. A CURRICULUM FOR EXPERIENCING THE NOMOs: A
PREREQUISITE TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING
Life is filled with amorphous situations, complex interrelations, puzzles,
and perplexities. The human task is to construct meaning."1 Education is
supposed to help with this task.
Scholars by definition construct meaning in the realms of their scholar-
ship, but this meaning often functions analogously to what Cover calls the
"jurispathic" function of the law.62 We are subject to their hermeneutic,
their understanding. We are not helped to move through the scholarly
problem as they first faced it. Instead, we learn only to understand the
solution they reached, after the earlier stages, where meaning was truly
constructed, have been filtered out."3 We come to the drama, in most
cases, too late, after the first two acts of the play are over.
The task is not to confront the choices of the scholar-neither those
already made nor those that need to be made-at least not at first. The
first objective is to reopen the possibilities, to return to the fluid situation
of "jurisgenesis,"' 6 where the choices are real, but yet to be determined. It
is to feel the pulls of realities that are not yet ours.
To enter another realm, another perspective, an unvoiced reality that
hovers over the explicit, to understand that alongside the Abraham who
says "Here I am" is the Abraham who says "No," 5 is to experience a
synthesis that is the sum of all articulations and goes beyond them. Cover
61. For a grand picture of how deeply rooted this human need is, see the story entitled A matter
of Identity, in 0. SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK His WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL
TALES 108 (1985).
62. See Cover, supra note 1, at 40-44.
63. H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, supra note 50, at 30 (teacher controls limits of discussion in case
method); Schwab, supra note 21, at 149-63 (construction of meaning as participatory process).
64. See Cover, supra note 1, at 11-19.
65. Genesis 22:1. I am grateful to my colleague, Professor Samuel Laeuchli of Temple University,
for this concept in the interpretation of the story of the Binding of Isaac in Genesis, part of his
broader work in the re-experiencing of the classic myths. See also S. SPIEGEL, THE LAST TRIAL (J.
Golden trans. 1967).
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powerfully evokes this synthesis in his treatment of the conflict between
the Biblical law of succession of the first-born son and Biblical narratives
of succession, which consistently ignore or oppose that law: "To be an
inhabitant of the biblical normative world is to understand, first, that the
rule of succession can be overturned; second, that it takes a conviction of
divine destiny to overturn it; and third, that divine destiny is likely to
manifest itself precisely in overturning this specific rule."6
Education needs to create worlds for students to experience, rather than
to reduce such worlds to the learning of abstract concepts or information.
Sports and games provide for a rich yet simplified experience of nomos
that can fulfill educational purpose.17 Generally speaking, educators neg-
lect the possibilities of this resource."' They go far afield to look for exam-
ples, when one that is of great interest to people of all ages is so near at
hand. BergerO9 points to the world of play as an opportunity for under-
standing the meaning of transcendence. Authors like Roger Angel 70 have
noted that baseball particularly, not being bound to a clock, represents a
timeless world that embodies the experience of the transcendent and, in
light of its rich and relatively well known history, the transpersonal too.
As an example, I suggest the famous "pine-tar" game between the
Kansas City Royals and the New York Yankees in 1983.71 In that game,
Royals' third baseman George Brett's potentially game-winning home run
was nullified because of the excess of pine-tar (used for secure grip) on his
bat. In response to the protests of Yankee manager Billy Martin, who was
waiting to invoke the "technicality" in just such an emergency, the
umpires agreed that the amount of pine-tar on the bat violated the rules.
The incident led to a tremendous popular debate about the spirit and
letter of the law. The arguments constituted perhaps the most widespread
popular legal debate in American history. The only recent rivals were
Watergate and the Baby M case, in which people were involved more in
the personal and political issues than in the finer legal points.
66. Cover, supra note 1, at 22.
67. Piaget's classic description of how children learn "rules" through the stages of their construc-
tion of the meaning of rules in the game of marbles is, insofar as it is a narrative case study, perhaps
more educationally successful in communicating his theory of stages than the rest of his book; at least
it is a powerful dimension of the theory. J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 13-108
(First Free Press ed. 1985).
68. See Lukinsky, Sports and Jewish Education, in STUDIES IN JEWISH EDUCATION IN HONOR
OF LOUIS NEWMAN (A. Shapiro & B. Cohen eds. 1984).
69. P. BERGER, A RUMOR OF ANGELS: MODERN SOCIETY AND THE REDISCOVERY OF THE SU-
PERNATURAL 60 (1969).
70. See, e.g., R. ANGELL, FIVE SEASONS (1972) and THE SUMMER GAME (1962).
71. I have done a great deal of background research on the pine-tar case for purposes of turning it
into a school unit as described briefly here. For an interesting view of the case from a legal perspec-
tive, and for sources of relevant materials, see Finkelstein, In re Brett: The Sticky Problem of Statu-
tory Construction, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 430 (1983).
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During the days after the pine-tar game, the partisans of both teams
and both sides of the argument argued loudly and enthusiastically. An
editor of The Sporting News told me that more mail was received on the
pine-tar ruling than on any other issue in that publication's history. 2
Journalists, poets, politicians, and others entered the debate. The New
York Times editorial page, truly coming out of left field, applied the pine-
tar incident to the issue of United States covert operations in Nicaragua!
3
Since Congress had "expressly forbidden a secret war to overthrow Nica-
ragua's leftist regime," President Reagan must obey. Abraham Lincoln,
"whom you might call a home-run hitter" would have agreed. "Slugger
Reagan may not like the fine-print, but who exempted him?" the editorial
continued, applying the "rule is a rule" thinking of the umpires' pine-tar
decision. A letter by President Nixon was quoted on the air by Yankee
broadcaster Phil Rizzuto in support of Brett, which impressed me greatly
until the possibility occurred to me that Nixon was sympathizing with
Brett for getting caught! Ira Berkow7' in the Sports Pages of the Times
made the issue of letter and spirit75 explicit and interviewed Talmudist
David Halivni on it.
After four days, the American League President Lee MacPhail over-
ruled the umpires' on-the-field call for the first time in his career. His
written decision reads like a Supreme Court opinion: it considers the
materials on both sides of the question, notes the umpires' neglect of the
precedents, 6 and candidly admits the difficulty of reconciling rules in dif-
ferent sections of the apodictic Baseball Rule Book, especially when the
game situation requires an immediate decision and the reasoning behind
the rules is not clear.
72. Telephone interview with R. Ray (summer 1983).
73. Yankees, Bats, and Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at A20, col. 1 (editorial).
74. Berkow, The Eternal Pine-Tar Case, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1983, at B9, col. 1.
75. Finkelstein, supra note 71, at 438-39 n.73, discusses this issue and another famous incident
involving "technical" enforcement of baseball's rules-the case of "Bonehead" Fred Merkle. In 1908,
Merkle's failure to run to second base while the winning run scored cost the Giants the pennant.
I believe that the two cases are different; the beauty of this inquiry is at the very point where the
two cases are contrasted. At what point does enforcement of the rule become completely separated
from the rule's intention and spirit? At what point does focus on "spirit" lead to anarchy? To be in
this cutting edge of the dialectic is educationally more important than the specific conclusions.
Berkow, supra note 74, misses the point by making some dubious analogies to suggest that, in
general, if the "spirit" of the rules were applied the game would truly be distorted. Finkelstein simi-
larly argues that the charm of the game inheres in strategies for using the rules to advantage and
stretching them as much as possible. They both miss the critical difference between Merkle's baserun-
ning mistake and Brett's bat. In the pine-tar case, strict enforcement of the rule would have been
based upon an incorrect-albeit resulting from unclear formulation of the rule in its various ver-
sions-interpretation of the intent of the rule itself. There was no such error in the Merkle case.
76. The same thing had happened to John Mayberry of the Royals (in a game against the Cali-
fornia Angels), and to Thurman Munson of the Yankees (against the Royals), in 1975. Mayberry's
two homers were not taken away; Munson's single was. See Finkelstein, supra note 71, at 438.
Mayberry vs. Munson eerily recalls Marbury v. Madison!
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At the time, MacPhail's decision, which was to the umpires' call as
more leisurely judicial review is to the decisions of cops on the beat, was a
bombshell. After MacPhail's carefully worded response, however, it was
hard to remember the previous amorphous state of the discussion and the
liveliness that characterized it. Working with this case Talmudically
would be to recapture that feeling, pre-MacPhail, when the arguments of
both sides were live and engaged. The newspaper accounts, the colum-
nists, the dialogue as a whole, could, with some effort, be presented
Talmudically. It is not just an argument about rules. It is a microcosm of
a nomos that so many Americans share.
A more current example involves a tension that still exists." The Na-
tional Basketball Association (NBA) does not allow the zone defense. The
purpose is to speed up the game, on the assumption that a faster game is
more crowd pleasing. This speeding-up has, however, been largely accom-
plished by the 24-second shot clock. College basketball, on the other hand,
allows the zone and only recently has installed a shot clock (allowing
more time, 45 seconds) to speed up its games. Connoisseurs often prefer
the college game, even without the shot clock, enjoying the finesse re-
quired to penetrate the zone, in contrast to the more free-wheeling pass
and shoot professional game. Yet, NBA coaches try to devise clever de-
fenses that approach the brink of being a "zone" without actually induc-
ing the referees to call a violation. This introduces a great deal of creativ-
ity that would be lost if the zone were allowed outright. We could try to
weigh the pros and cons and decide, but whatever our choice, something is
lost. The quest is not for the "correct" rule. There may be a decision at
some point and that would raise another interesting issue, but the main
point for our purposes is that the tension itself is so exquisite, so rich in
its possibilities for looking at all sides simultaneously even without coming
to any conclusions.
I once participated with the great psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim in a
seminar in Jerusalem which dealt with the question of nurturing the
thought processes of disadvantaged children. One educator raised the issue
of children who thought that the astronauts' trip to and from the moon
was not the same distance. After rejecting group members' suggestions for
confronting this issue, Bettelheim said he would conduct an extended dis-
cussion, hearing out all the students' views at length. He noted that one of
the problems of these children is that they are always told the answer and
never have the almost tangible experience of thinking something through
thoroughly. Bright chidren answer too quickly, limiting the experience of
77. For full treatment of this issue, see Koppett, Should NBA Legalize the Zone?, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 4, 1978, at 38, col. 1. I have also in seminars related this experientially to Jewish law. See
Maimonides Code, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mamrim, Ch. 2.
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the thinking process for children who grasp the point more slowly and
thus are simply given the "correct" result. After a long discussion, a
teacher asked, "But what would you do to convince them of the right an-
swer?"78 I will never forget Bettelheim's look of disdain! For him, the
conclusion was not of primary importance if the discussion helped teach
the children to think.
V. CONCLUSION
Education should give us generic memories of the human race that sup-
plement, enrich, and, most of all, inform those which belong to each of us
alone. To do this it needs to recreate those crucial moments at which we
stand on the verge of the creation of meaning. Those moments are to be
savored and appreciated. The skill to be developed is related to the quality
of patience, the art of being in those moments.
Education is challenged to create worlds to be experienced, not worlds
cut down to the size of our preconceptions. The construction of meaning is
the second stage. We jump to it too quickly. We seek the solution before
we experience the problem, before we confront the world on its own
terms. We need to know the territory, not only the map.
Bob Cover's nomos is a normative world where one does not learn to
think a certain way, but where one experiences a complex dialectical ten-
sion. It consists of formulated principles, laws and the narratives that in-
form them, conflict, personal choices, values, struggle, and more. The ex-
perience in depth of a nomos is missing from many lives today. It is not a
matter of not knowing what to do or what to think. It is a matter of
consciousness, of knowing who and where we are.
To learn a nomos is to participate in a normative world, in which for-
mulated law is understood only in its relationships to the rest, to the nar-
ratives, to the aspirations, to the hopes. 9 The process of teach-
ing-teaching anything, law, history, or literature-is immersion in
worlds other than our own. The worlds of human history are alien to us,
but do we not need to know them if we are to construct our own world of
meaning?
78. In fairness to the children, they were probably correct, without knowing why. Because the
moon's orbit is not a perfect circle, the spacecraft's route is not a straight line, and the landing point is
different from the departure point, it is quite likely that the trips to and from the moon did not
traverse the same distance. The children, however, did not necessarily reason in this way. Instead,
they relied on their subjective experience-"it seems to me the return trip took longer".-and used it
to reach the conclusion that the trips were, objectively, of different lengths.
79. In Nomos and Narrative, supra note 1, at 44 passim, Cover deals extensively with commit-
mnet-of judges and of nomic communities-especially as commitment affects the process of judicial
inquiry itself. Commitment is not the focus here, but commitment, no less than full participation in a
normative world, is magnificently exemplified in Cover's life.
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The study of law, like literature or history, is potentially a rich resource
for our lives. But the task of education is to use what scholars say to get
back to that world which existed before they said it. The tension between
the two produces the educational moment, when what has happened, hap-
pens now. Participation in this way in learning the law is empathy, par-
ticipation in the inquiry itself, for its own sake. As it is in the study of the
Talmud. As it was in Bob Cover's life and work.
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